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The ‘Socratic Fallacy’ in Plato’s Early Dialogues 
Priscilla K. Sakezies 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Akron, Ohio
I. Introduction
In ‘Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary’ (33), Peter Geach attributes two 
assumptions to Socrates which he calls the ‘Socratic Fallacy’ since its locus classicus is the early Socratic 
dialogues:
(A) if  you know you are correctly predicating a given term ‘T ,’ you must ‘know what it is to 
be T ’ in the sense of being able to give a general criterion for a thing’s being T;
(B) it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning o f ‘T ’ by giving examples of things that are T. 
Geach claims that (B) follows from (A) because assuming (A) is true, one cannot know that an instance of 
T is really an instance of T unless one already knows ‘what T is.’ Hence, examples will not help in the 
search for a definition. (A) can also be called ‘the priority of definition principle’ because it essentially 
claims that one must know the definition of a term before one can know anything about that term.
The attribution of this ‘fallacy’ to Socrates has provoked many scholars to come to his defense: 
Vlastos, Santas, Beversluis, Woodruff, and Nehamas,1 for instance, deny that the Socratic Fallacy can be 
found in the dialogues (although they have varying formulations of precisely what it is that Socrates does 
not say). Most recently, William Prior argues that (A) does in fact occur in the dialogues, but rather than 
being a fallacy it is ‘a perfectly innocent consequence of Platonic epistemology.’2 That is, for Plato, to 
have ‘knowledge’ or episteme that something is T does require having a correct definition of T. Prior 
argues that this is a reasonable demand in the case of ethical terms such as ‘courage’ and ‘virtue’ and that 
Geach sees this as a fallacy only because he assumes a Wittgensteinian conception of knowledge in which 
‘meaning is use.’3
I agree with Prior that Socrates does endorse (A) and that (A) is a consequence of Plato’s 
epistemology. But I shall argue that Socrates ’ adoption o f (A) leads to problematic consequences which 
Plato cannot accept and which he attempts to evade. Thus I argue for a developmental thesis. In the early 
dialogues Plato via the character of Socrates makes many claims which together suggest that he holds (A) 
to be true.4 At this stage of Plato’s philosophical development he cannot successfully define any ethical 
term T and the consequence of this combined with (A) is that he cannot know anything about T. This 
consequence commits Plato to a serious form of skepticism at this point. In the Meno, a transitional 
dialogue in which Plato’s own views begin to replace those of Socrates, Plato still assumes (A) to be true 
but Meno’s Paradox (80de) for the first time indicates explicit consciousness of the consequences of (A): 
how can one even search for something one does not know at all? Plato’s response to this question—the 
doctrine of recollection and then, in the Phaedo, the transcendence of the forms—is his way of avoiding the 
skepticism to which Socrates is committed.
In section II, I shall survey the evidence for (A) in the Socratic dialogues, for I do believe it can be 
found there, pace Vlastos et al. Then, in section III, I shall argue that the Meno is the precise point at 
which Plato recognizes the problematic consequences of (A) and offers a multi-dimensional solution to this 
problem.
Π. The Socratic Fallacy in the Definition Dialogues
The ‘Socratic Fallacy’ per se consists of both (A) and (B). But my focus is (A) alone, which I 
shall revise to a more comprehensive formulation: ‘to know that ...T—, one must know what the T (T-ness) 
is.’5 This includes cases where T is subject, as well as cases where T is predicate; e.g. ‘justice is a virtue’ 
and ‘to benefit one’s friends is just.’ I prefer to call this assumption the priority of definition principle 
(PD), which asserts that ‘if one fails to know what T-ness is, then one foils to know anything about T-ness’ 
(Benson’s formulation, 19), i.e., knowing the definition of T-ness is a necessary condition for knowing
2anything about T-ness. The dialogues which provide evidence for (PD) are Republic I, Charmides, Laches, 
Lysis, and Hippias Major.
The first instance of (PD) is Republic I, 354bc: ‘the result o f our discussion for me is that I know 
nothing; for, when I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it is a kind of a virtue or not, 
or whether the just man is unhappy or happy. ’6 This is a fairly explicit statement of (PD). Vlastos, 
however, claims that ‘tacked on at the end of Book I, this cannot belong to the composition which precedes 
it’ (1985, 26, n. 65). He argues that, in 351a, Socrates asserts ‘injustice is ignorance’ as a conclusion that 
‘nobody could still not know,’ which implies that justice is knowledge, which implies that justice is virtue. 
But this final conclusion contradicts 354c; therefore the latter must be ‘tacked on.’ This reasoning is 
unpersuasive. In 354a-c, Socrates explains his dissatisfaction with the dialogue’s results: he begins by 
inquiring into the nature of justice, but becomes sidetracked by questions about the attributes of justice. 
354c shows that he thinks the digression is self-defeating because he cannot know the attributes of justice 
without first knowing the nature of justice itself. This ending gives Republic I the same sort of aporetic 
conclusion shared by all the Socratic definition dialogues. If  the book had ended at 354a, with the total 
success of proving that justice is more profitable than injustice, then Republic I would be very un-Socratic. 
In short, the ending that Vlastos considers ‘tacked on’ is very appropriate to and characteristic of the 
definition dialogues.
Additionally, it makes no sense, as Vlastos argues, for the ending to be tacked on. The only 
reason a new ending would be added to Republic I is to smooth the transition to II-X, which most scholars 
agree were written during Plato’s middle period. But 354bc, with its profession of ignorance and despair at 
not having a definition of justice, is in direct conflict with the following nine books, where ‘Socrates’ knows 
all sorts of things, not the least of which is the definition of justice. Thus, it seems that the instance o f (PD) 
at the close of Republic I should be considered genuinely Socratic.
A second, though less explicit, instance of (PD) is Charmides 176a. Failing to find an adequate 
definition of sophrosune, temperance, Charmides says at the end:
But heavens, Socrates, I don’t know whether I possess it or whether I don't. How- 
can I know it, when, on your own admission, not even you and Critias are able to 
discover what on earth it is?
Apparently, the point of this is that if one does not know what T is, one cannot even know whether one 
possesses the quality of T. Vlastos argues that this passage provides no evidence for the Socratic Fallacy 
because assumption (A) is not asserted ‘in full generality,’ i.e. it does not say that ‘if  one does not know the 
T one can’t know if anything whatever is T ’ (1985, 23, n.54).7 While he is correct that the assumption in 
its most general form is not asserted in Charmides 176a, this criticism is not to the point. Charmides’ 
remark is a manifestation o f a larger claim; it is one variation on a Socratic theme. Thus, the absence of 
the larger claim in a given passage does not prove that the passage is not an instance of that claim.
Beversluis, likewise, dismisses 176a as evidence for the Socratic Fallacy because o f its lack of 
generality. He says:
Charmides does not say that without a definition of temperance he cannot know 
that any actions are temperate but only that he cannot know whether he is 
temperate~a remark which is nothing but a more emphatic reaffirmation of the 
philosophically and psychologically intimidated state of mind to which he had 
already given ventât 15 9d 1-6. (214)
But again, Socrates’ expression of (PD) by means o f particular instances is no evidence against the claim 
that he holds the more general assumption. The whole point of calling (PD) an ‘assumption’ is to indicate 
that it is largely implicit in the dialogues and only occasionally manifests itself in passages such as those I 
am now discussing. (PD) itself is, o f course, a scholar’s explanatory device; Socrates does not run around 
saying ‘you can’t know that anything is T unless you know what T is.’ Furthermore, Charmides does not 
strike me as being ‘philosophically and psychologically intimidated.’ Quite the contrary, Chaimides seems 
well aware of the power of his beauty and openly flirts with the mature Socrates in the closing scene,
playfully threatening violence to make Socrates ‘charm’ him and telling Socrates not to resist him (176a-d). 
Although Socrates initiates this flirtation. Charmides’ playful response is not consistent with his being 
psychologically intimidated.
Santas attempts to explain Charmides’ question at 176a by appealing to the context in which it
occurs:
When his more experienced elders had failed to discover and understand what 
temperance is, it would have been unseemly and arrogant for Charmides to declare 
in answer to Socrates’ question, ‘you two, and I too, do not know what 
temperance is, but I certainly do know that I am temperate.’ (138)
This explanation trivializes Charmides’ remark and suggests that while he does believe that he possesses 
the undefined virtue, he refuses to admit it. But perhaps we should take him more seriously. After all, he 
does agree with Socrates that if  sophrosune were in him, he should be able to say what it is (159a); so, 
when he finds himself unable to define it, shouldn’t he genuinely wonder whether or not he possesses it?
To the above argument Santas adds, ‘And on top of all this, it is to be noted that the question, and 
the implication that goes with it, is Charmides’ in this passage, not Socrates” (139). True, but these are 
Plato’s words. Charmides’ closing remarks at 176ab are the dramatic conclusion of the dialogue. If 
Socrates disagrees with Charmides’ remarks or their implications, surely he would object. Socrates is not 
reticent when it comes to pointing out others’ mistakes. His silence implies agreement. O f course, he has 
no reason to disagree, for Charmides is expressing a Socratic assumption. The words could have been 
Socrates’ just as well as Charmides’.
A third instance of (PD) occurs in Laches 190bc. In the Laches, Socrates is inquiring how to make 
the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias virtuous, but, in order to achieve this, they must first know what 
virtue is. Socrates asks: ‘Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how' can we advise anyone 
about the best mode of attaining something of whose nature we are wholly (to parapari) ignorant?’8 This 
rhetorical question clearly implies that one must know ‘what virtue is’ before one can determine how to 
achieve it, which is another particular instance of the assumption that to know that ...T—, one must know 
what T is.
Vlastos (1985, 23, n.54) and Beversluis (215) again dismiss this passage for its lack of the full 
generality of (A). But again I must reply that their criticisms are not to the point. Laches 190bc does not 
assert (PD) per se, and no one claims that it does so, but it does manifest a particular instance of the 
assumption. And the sum of the particular instances does seem to suggest a more general viewpoint.9
A fourth occurrence of (PD) is at Lysis 212a, where Socrates again implies that one must know 
what T is before one can know howr to acquire T : ‘I’m so far from acquiring one that I don’t even know 
how one man becomes the friend of another. ’ And, after failing to define what a friend is, the dialogue 
concludes with a fifth instance of (PD) when Socrates says:
Lysis and Menexenus, we’ve now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like 
me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think we’re friends of 
one another—for I consider myself one o f your number—though we were not as yet 
able to find out precisely what a friend is. (223b)
This remark implies that one must know' what a friend is before one can even be or have a friend. Socrates 
has made a fool of himself insofar as he does think he is and has a friend but is unable to define a friend; 
that is, he realizes that he is contradicting (PD).
Vlastos admits that Lysis 223b does assert that ‘if one does not know what the T is, one cannot 
know if  T is truly predicable of anything whatever’ (1985, 23, n.54). (However, this admission seems 
inconsistent with his denial that Charmides 176a instantiates (PD), since this passage is merely an instance 
of (A) as applied to friendship. Lysis 223b is more general than Charmides 176a, but it certainly is not (A) 
in its ‘full generality.’) But Vlastos argues that Socrates’ assertion is either vacuous or false, depending on 
how we read ‘know’ (1985, 26). Vlastos attempts to resolve the paradox of Socrates’ disavowal of 
knowledge by proposing a dual use of ‘know’ in the early dialogues. When Socrates says he does not know
4anything, he means that he does not know anything with certainty, and Vlastos represents this type o f 
knowledge as ‘knowledge,;.’ But when Socrates says or implies that he does know something, he means 
that he has ‘elenctically justified true belief about that thing (i.e. his belief has not yet been elenctically 
refuted), represented by ‘knowledge,.’ (1985, 18). Socrates does not then contradict himself when he 
sometimes avows and sometimes disavows knowledge-he is merely using two distinct conceptions of 
knowledge.
Applying this distinction to assumption (A) (or my (PD)) Vlastos says:
If  the question ‘is (A) true?’ had been put to Socrates in the elenctic dialogues it 
would have required further specification. He would have needed to be told how 
he should read ‘know’ in (A). Should he read it as ‘know /? If so, (A) turns into
(Ac) If one does not knowc what the T is, one cannot knowc if  T is truly predicable 
of anything whatever.
Or should he take it in the alternative sense, reading it as
(Ae) If one does not knowe what the T is, one cannot knowe if  T is truly predicable 
of anything whatever.
...For the Socrates of the elenctic dialogues, who has renounced knowledgec lock, 
stock, and barrel, (Ac) would be vacuous: he has no interest in knowingc 
anything... But now suppose, alternatively, that he had read (A) in the sense of 
(Ae). In that case he would have declared it false. Thus at [Ap. 29b 6-7] he 
‘knows’ (=knowse) that he can predicate ‘evil’ and ‘base’ o f ‘doing injustice and 
disobeying his superior’, though no definition of either predicate has been assayed 
and there is no good reason to believe that if it had been it would have met with 
greater success than had any of those pursued in dialogues of elenctic search...
Thus once the critical verb has been disambiguated, (A) is trouble-free for the 
Socrates of the elenctic dialogues: innocuous if read as (Ac), false as (A«). (1985,
25-26)
But why would we have to ask Socrates if (A) is true? He asserts it in various formulations, as we 
have seen, as a truth. Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation’ of the meaning of ‘know’ does not disprove that Socrates 
holds assumption (A); Vlastos ends up admitting that (A) is in the text (at least at Lysis 223b), but argues 
that Socrates does not really mean it! That is, since Vlastos claims that Socrates has renounced 
knowledgec, it must be (Ae) that Socrates asserts in the above-mentioned passages. But Vlastos says that 
for Socrates (Ae) would be false. Does this not put Vlastos in the position of making Socrates contradict 
himself, or assert something he does not mean (the very problem Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation’ purports to 
solve)? Vlastos’ dichotomy may resolve some textual problems and it may even resolve the paradox of 
Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge (although I do not think so10). However, Vlastos’ application o f it to the 
Socratic Fallacy makes Socrates’ assertions of die aforementioned instances of (A) incoherent. Regardless 
of precisely what sense we give to ‘know,’ I believe that we should take Socrates more seriously when he 
asserts (A), instead of trying to explain it away at any cost.
A sixth, and very explicit, assertion of (PD) occurs at the close of Hippias Major, after Socrates 
has failed to define to kalon, the fine. He says of his alter-ego:
he asks me if I am not ashamed of my effrontery in discussing fine occupations, 
when questioning shows how obviously ignorant I am even about what fineness 
itself is. ‘And yet,’ he continues, ‘how can you know whose speech or other action 
is finely formed, if  you’re ignorant about fineness? Don’t  you think you might as 
well be dead, in such a condition?’ (304de)
The point here is quite obviously that without knowledge of ‘what fineness is,’ one cannot know whether 
anything is or is not fine. This is (PD) in its full generality. In his commentary on this dialogue. W oodruff 
states the Socratic Fallacy as ‘supposing that a person cannot use a word correctly unless he can define it’ 
(139) and denies that Socrates commits it. He says that Hippias Major 304de commits Socrates to
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believing that ‘knowing the definition o f the fine is prior to knowing of anything that it is fine’ (140), which 
is also how I read the passage. But what W oodruff posits as the Socratic Fallacy is a much weaker version 
o f (PD), whereas the thesis he admits Hippias Major does assert is an instance o f what I am calling (PD). 
Therefore, Woodruff does believe that Socrates holds (PD) in this dialogue. The difference between 
W oodruff1 s version of the Socratic Fallacy and (PD) is that between using a term T correctly and knowing 
that ...T -.
Vlastos attempts to dismiss 304de as another instance of (Ae) which Socrates considers false 
(1985, 24-26), but as the rebuke is coming from the lips of his alter-ego, Socrates certainly accepts it as 
true. The final question, in fact, suggests that Socrates (or Plato) is aware of the deadly serious 
consequences of (PD).11
Socrates seems to recognize how problematic (PD) is in that he himself does at times make claims 
about T without having a definition for it. However, this contradiction is not evidence that Socrates does 
not hold (PD), but rather manifests the difficulties inherent in Socrates’ manner of seeking definitions. He 
believes that all particular instances of T have something in common, some immanent quality, by virtue of 
which they all are T: this quality is ‘the T’ or ‘T-ness.’ His criteria for an adequate definition of the T 
require that definiens and definiendum be co-extensive. Unfortunately for him, this requirement proves 
impossible to satisfy (at least for ethical terms; Socrates can define ‘shape’ and ‘color’ to his satisfaction, 
Meno 76a-d). So, as long as Socrates holds definitional knowledge to be a necessary condition for knowing 
that an ethical term applies to any particular case, he cannot know whether or not the term applies. This is 
of course a difficult predicament to put oneself in, as Plato seems to recognize in the Meno (to be addressed 
below).
The evidence of the passages I have discussed indicates that assumption (PD) can be found in the 
Socratic dialogues. Much of scholars’ criticism against the Socratic Fallacy is really directed against 
Geach’s assumption (B), that ‘it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of “T” by giving examples o f 
things that are T. ’ Santas, for instance, argues against Socrates’ holding assumption (A) primarily by 
showing that he does not hold (B), which he, following Geach, believes is entailed by (A). But Santas 
proves that Socrates does not hold (B) merely by indicating his frequent use of examples. Santas is 
perfectly correct that Socrates accepts and uses examples in searching for definitions. Socrates does not 
object to examples of a definiendum per se; he only rejects them as adequate definiens. However, Prior 
argues persuasively that (A) does not entail (B), the claim that it is no use trying to find a definition o f T by 
giving examples of things that are T. This is because.
It is a perfectly intelligible procedure, one followed in all forms of classificatory endeavor, to 
consider many alleged examples of a given term in the hope of coming up with a general criterion 
or general criteria o f classification. Once one has developed or discovered such criteria, one can 
then use them to sort through the initial set of alleged examples and separate those that truly belong 
to the class from those that merely appear to. ( I l l )
So considering alleged examples of T can be useful in discovering the definition o f T. However, what (A) 
does entail is that ‘one cannot know that än alleged example of T is a genuine example’ until one knows the 
definition of T (ibid., 110). And this is problematic for Plato.
The problem which Plato via the character of Socrates occasionally seems to notice is that his and 
others’ knowledge claims conflict with his assumption about the priority of definition. Laches says that he 
likes to hear a man who is in tune with his words, who lives by his principles (Laches 188c-e). After 
several failed attempts to define bravery, Socrates tells Laches that they must not be ‘tuned,’ because their 
words and actions do not harmonize:
If people judged us by our actions, they might well say that we had our share of 
bravery; but to judge from this conversation, I don’t think they would if  they could 
hear us discussing it. (193e)
6This and similar passages (e.g. Lysis 223b, Hippias Major 304de) suggest that Socrates is cognizant of a 
conflict. If he is aware o f it, and Plato takes steps in the Meno specifically to resolve this conflict, why 
should we, his readers, be so eager to deny that there is a problem?
III. The Socratic Fallacy in the Meno 
Next, I propose to examine the role this assumption plays in the Meno, which I take to be 
transitional between the early dialogues in which Plato reports Socrates’ views and method and the middle 
dialogues in which Plato’s own method and metaphysics are voiced through Socrates’ persona. (PD) 
appears to be affirmed several times in the Meno, yet after failing to define virtue, Socrates agrees to 
inquire whether virtue is teachable—a task he is not warranted in attempting if  he still holds to (PD)—if  he 
can use a new hypothetical method. Meno’s Paradox explicitly confronts us with the consequences of (PD) 
and Plato’s doctrine of recollection is offered as a solution to this problem. Yet another Platonic 
innovation, the view that true belief alone is sufficient for correct action, and hence for virtue, also seems to 
address the impasse Socrates finds himself in due to assuming (PD). Thus, the Meno simultaneously 
affirms the priority of definition principle, recognizes its problematic consequences, and offers a multi­
dimensional solution.
The Meno opens with Socrates ironically praising Meno for his wisdom. Socrates contrasts 
Meno’s teacher, Gorgias, who has a ready answer for any question, with the Athenians as a whole. If  any 
Athenian were asked whether virtue w7ere teachable, he would respond: ‘Good stranger, you must think me 
happy indeed if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from 
knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any {to parapan) knowledge of what 
virtue itself is’ (71a). Although this clear instantiation of (PD) is attributed to the Athenians at large, 
Socrates immediately claims the assumption for himself:
I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, and I blame myself for my 
complete (to parapan) ignorance about virtue. If  I do not know what something is (ho ti esti), how 
could I know what qualities it possesses (hopoion ti <esti>)l Or do you think that someone who 
does not know at all (to parapan) who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or 
well-born, or the opposite of these? (71b)
This explicit formulation of (PD)—if one fails to know what T-ness is, then one fails to know7 
anything about T-ness—echoes the occurrences in the earlier dialogues discussed above. What is strikingly 
new is the explicit and thrice-repeated qualification to parapan. This adverb occurs only a few times in the 
early Socratic dialogues, but nearly 150 times in Plato’s later works (most occurrences are in the Laws). 
Interestingly, in the Laches passage where (PD) occurs ( 190bc, discussed above), to parapan is used 
exactly as it is in the Meno. Socrates there asks: ‘Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For 
how can we advise anyone about the best mode of attaining something of whose nature we are wholly (to 
parapan) ignorant?’ In more general terms, if one does not know at ail what the T is, one cannot know7 
anything at all about the T ’s qualities (e.g., whether it is teachable, how to get it for oneself). This is taken 
quite seriously in the Laches and, like all the other early definition dialogues, this one is aporetic. No other 
occurrence of to parapan in the early dialogues (or elsewhere) is used to qualify a knowledge verb as in the 
Meno.
I suggest that Plato repeats this assumption in the early dialogues as an authentically Socratic 
view, but is by the Meno painfully aware of its problematic consequences. So here the view is stated quite 
self-consciously, the gist o f it being that a total, unqualified lack of knowledge of a thing’s ‘what it is’ (ho 
ti esti) results in a total ignorance of that thing’s qualities (hopoion ti esti). But this suggests that some 
sort or degree o f knowledge of (or acquaintance with, etc.) what a  thing is may yield a corresponding 
degree of knowledge of that thing’s qualities. In other words, Plato’s set-up o f this assumption at the very 
opening of the Meno is deliberate and, while he still accepts the strong form to be true, he is searching for a 
way around it.
(PD) may occur again at 79c. Meno defines virtue as the acquisition of beautiful things 
accompanied by justice or some other part of virtue, but Socrates points out that they have made no
7l··
progress in defining virtue itself. He asks, ‘do you think one knows what a part of virtue is if one does not 
know virtue itself?’ Socrates may simply be indicating the fallacy of circular definition, i.e., that the 
definiens cannot contain the definiendum. But it may also manifest another occurrence of (PD): one 
cannot know the ‘what it is’ o f justice unless one knows the ‘what it is’ of virtue, since justice is a part of
virtue.12
(PD) comes into play a third time in Meno’s Paradox at 80d. After several unsuccessful attempts 
to define virtue, Meno complains that although he has made many fine speeches about virtue, now he 
cannot even say what it is~Socrates has transferred his own state o f being at a loss or in doubt (aporein) to 
Meno. Yet Socrates still wants to continue the search for ‘what virtue is’ despite both parties’ lack of 
knowledge. Now Meno objects:
How will you look for i t , Socrates, when you do not know at all (to parapan) what it is? How 
will you aim to search for something you do not know <at all>13? If you should meet with it, how 
wall you know that this is the thing that you did not know? (80d)
Note that to parapan recurs here for the fourth time. Socrates restates this paradox:
Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for 
what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he 
knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to 
look for. (80d)
This problem seems to be a direct consequence of the priority of definition principle. Socrates’ 
goal is to make men who think they are knowledgeable, recognize that they do not in fact know, thus 
making them eager to search for knowledge. At this goal, Socrates was successful. But he never actually 
succeeds in finding the sort of definitions he seeks and perhaps this is unimportant to him. We may never 
know how skeptical Socrates the man actually was, but the evidence from the early dialogues suggests that, 
for him, exposing ignorance is much more important than attaining positive knowledge. After recording so 
many aporetic dialogues, however, Plato seems to tire of Socrates’ repeated failures. Perhaps Meno’s 
criticism is really Plato’s realization that he will never be able to find the ‘what it is’ of virtue, justice, 
beauty, etc., as long as he continues to follow Socrates. Here, in the Meno, ‘Socrates’ escapes Meno’s 
Paradox and the consequences of (PD) by the doctrine of recollection, a Platonic innovation.
Socrates does not deny the truth of Meno’s criticism, despite his acknowledgement that the 
argument does not seem to him to be well-stated (81a). Rather than saying Meno’s paradox is false, i.e., 
just denying it, Socrates offers recollection as a way around it. Socrates affirms as a true conditional that 
if we have no knowledge of a thing whatsoever, then we can know nothing about it (i.e., what sort o f thing 
it is, hopoion ti esti), and hence cannot even begin to search for it. But he now, for the first time, denies 
the antecedent: in a way, we do have knowledge. The doctrine of recollection is his attempt to explain in 
what way we have it and how it can be extracted from the soul. If  we were dealing with the epistemology 
of the Republic, it would be impossible to know something ‘in a way:’ there the only objects of knowledge 
are forms and there seems to be only one degree of knowledge of them—either one knows the forms or one 
does not. Belief, on the other hand, is of the sensible world, which cannot be known (529c), giving us an 
ontological and epistemological dichotomy. In the Meno, however, belief and knowledge are of the same 
object, the difference is that a true belief which is tied down ‘by giving an account of the reason why’ 
becomes known (97e-98a). Hence, in the Meno, there are degrees between belief and knowledge.
After explaining to Meno how' learning is really recollection, Socrates wants to launch into a 
second attempt to ‘recollect’ what virtue is. Meno however insists on inquiring whether virtue is teachable, 
which is after all his original question. Socrates then seems to affirm (PD) again (the fourth time by my 
count) when he tells Meno that they should not investigate whether virtue is teachable before investigating 
what virtue is. But he gives in to Meno, saying ‘So we must, it appears, inquire into the qualities of 
something (poion to esti, what sort o f thing it is) the nature (ho ti esti, what it is) of which we do not yet 
know’ (86e). Socrates agrees to do what he really should not do if he can begin the inquiry with a 
hypothesis. This hypothetical method, which Socrates attributes to the geometers, is new in the dialogues.
8and in conjunction with other evidence in the Meno, it indicates a radical shift to a mathematical paradigm 
of investigation.14 This new method is presented as a direct solution to the problem of seeking that of 
which one is totally ignorant. After explaining a geometrical example of the hypothetical method, Socrates 
says, ‘So let us speak about virtue also, since (epeide) we do not know either what it is (ho ti esti) or what 
qualities it possesses (hopoion ti esti) and let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means o f a 
hypothesis...’ (87b). By this method, instead of asking directly whether virtue is teachable (or now, 
recollectable), they will ask whether virtue is a kind of knowledge: if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught; 
if  not, then not, since only knowledge can be taught (87b-c).
As it turns out, Socrates claims that virtue is not knowledge nor is it teachable. In the course of 
arguing for this conclusion, Socrates expresses another Platonic innovation: true opinion alone is sufficient 
for correct action and hence for virtue. The Meno concludes with the doctrine that virtue is neither taught, 
nor a natural endowment, but is a gift from the gods. Not only poets and prophets, but also statesmen are 
divinely inspired when they utter true opinions but lack nous (99b-100b). Socrates mentions no other 
source o f our true opinions. At 85c, the slave boy is said to have true opinions ‘in him;’ 85e-86a seem to 
say that since these opinions were not acquired in his present life the boy ‘had them and had learned them’ 
at a prior time ‘when he was not a human being. ’ All this suggests that Socrates thinks o f true opinions in 
general as divinely bestowed, though divine dispensation may consist of whatever happens to souls 
between incarnations.13 The turning of opinion into knowledge, however, is a human activity, achieved by 
the dialectical process exemplified in Socrates’ lesson to the slave boy. This is the process of ‘tying down’ 
true opinions by giving an account of the reason why, which, Socrates says, is recollection (98a).
Socrates’ closing remarks are again suggestive of (PD). After concluding that virtue is a gift from 
the gods, he says, ‘We shall have clear knowledge o f this when, before we investigate how it comes to be 
present in men, we first try to find out what virtue in itself is’ (100b). This is not nearly as strong as (PD) 
nor as negative. Rather than claim that knowing the ‘what it is’ is a necessary condition for knowing a 
thing’s qualities, Socrates now says that if  we search for what virtue is in itself (auto hath ’ hauto), we will 
affirm what we have already discovered via the hypothetical method. While this still stresses the priority of 
definition, it no longer requires it unconditionally.
IV. Conclusion
In the Meno, we find Socrates espousing many doctrines unheard of in earlier dialogues. The 
doctrine of recollection and the immortality of the soul are the centerpiece of the Phaedo, but recollection is 
dropped until a brief recurrence in the Phaedrus. The hypothetical method and the mathematical paradigm 
are most important in the Republic, where Plato proposes to define the just man on the hypothesis that he is 
analogous to a larger entity, the just state. Also vital to the Republic is the view' that true belief is sufficient 
for virtue (even craftsmen and soldiers can be virtuous, but only guardians have knowledge), although as 
noted above, Plato is dualistic in his epistemology and ontology due to his theory of forms. (PD), however, 
does not recur in any Platonic dialogue (assuming Republic I to be early). The abandonment of this 
assumption coincides with Plato’s abandonment o f Socratic skepticism and his embracing of his own 
peculiar dogmatism. The Meno records a moment of intellectual turmoil in Plato’s thought, when he is 
pulling away from the Socratic views he has been recording and is struggling to find his own way. In this 
dialogue, Plato affirms the priority of definition principle as a true conditional (if one has no knowledge 
whatsoever of ‘what a thing is,’ then one can know nothing about that thing’s qualities) but he now denies 
the antecedent. Meno’s Paradox illustrates the skeptical consequences of (PD) and Plato’s new views on 
recollection, the hypothetical method, and true belief offer a way out of Socratic aporia.
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’See References.
2 ‘Plato and the “Socratic Fallacy,”’ Phronesis 43 (1998), 97.
3 Ibid., 102.
41 hold the standard view that in the ‘early’ dialogues Plato expresses and endorses the views of the 
historical Socrates. My argument, however, need only assume that the early dialogues express Plato ’s 
early views, which he ammended as his thought developed.
5 Where ‘...T—’ represents any sentence in which T occurs. ‘To know what the T is’ consists of having the 
sort o f definitional knowledge that Socrates sought in the definition dialogues.
61 use the following translations: G.M.A. Grube’s Republic and Meno (the latter from his Plato: Five 
Dialogues)·, Benjamin Jowett’s Laches (from The Collected Dialogues o f  Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns); Donald W att’s Charmides and Lysis, and Robin Waterfield’s Hippias Major 
(from Early Socratic Dialogues, edited by Trevor J. Saunders).
71 change Vlastos’ ‘F’ to ‘T ’ for the sake of consistency within this paper.
8 The significance of to parapan will be discussed in section HI.
9 This is exactly Benson’s point in his excellent paper ‘The Priority of Definition and the Socratic 
Elenchus,’ 22-44.
10 See Lesher for a persuasive critique of Vlastos’ ‘disambiguation;’ but he agrees with Vlastos that the 
Socratic Fallacy (he calls it ‘Geach’s Paradox’) does not occur in the Socratic dialogues. Yonezawa also 
rejects Vlastos’ solution and offers an interesting alternative.
” Brickhouse and Smith think this is a hyperbole (29), but it may presage Plato’s view in the Phaedo: 
‘wisdom,’ true knowledge of things in themselves, can be attained only after the death of the body, which is 
an impediment to knowledge (66a ff).
12 O f course, we should ask how he knows that justice is a part of virtue, since (PD) really commits us to 
skepticism, but that is another problem.
13 to parapan does not occur here; Grube’s translation is a bit misleading.
14 See Vlastos’ ‘Elenchus and Mathematics’ for a persuasive argument for this claim.
15 Even if Plato did believe this at the time he wrote the Meno, there is no evidence that he had worked out 
the details. While it may be possible to extract from the Meno a fairly clear account of the process o f 
recollecting a piece of knowledge, Plato is very sketchy about what happens before birth.
